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The Military Technical Revolution - From Hardware to Information

Captain John W. Bodnar, U.S. Navy Reserve

Naval War College Review. Summer 1993. Vol. 46 pp.7-21

The conduct of war has has changed dramatically from World War II to Operation Desert Storm. The major differences have come through a revolution in military technology. As we look to the world of the year 2002 we need to address the Military Technical Revolution (MTR) to be able to project how much the next war will be different from Desert Storm as the MTR continues.

An analysis of technological changes since World War II indicates that the MTR has had three distinct phases which started at different times, are at different stages, and, therefore, should continue or end in the future at different times:

1)A military engineering revolution which changed weapons, platforms, and military hardware. This phase of the MTR began during World War II and virtually ended during the 1980's.

2)A military sensor revolution which began with the advent of computerized sensors and weapons control systems in the early 1970's and multipled the capabilities of individual platforms by increasing the ability to sort data effectively and control weapons at long ranges. This phase of the MTR is in its last half and will likely wind down in the 1990's.

3)A military communications revolution which began in the late 1970's through new C3I capabilities and increased education and again multiplied the total force but this time through coordinated air/sea/land operations. This phase was most evident during Desert Storm and will continue as the lessons learned of that war are applied.

Therefore, the effectiveness of any military fighting force in the year 2002 will depend on hardware, sensors, and communications in ways that are totally different than even ten years ago. By projecting changes in these three areas since World War II, it is likely that force structures in the year 2002 will be most different from those of today in their abilities to integrate sensors and communications.

1)The Miltary Engineering Revolution. World War II to Vietnam - High Tech Hardware

Technology has always had a major impact on military operations going backat least to the invention of gunpowder; but, the impact of technology became even greater with two revolutions - the advent of mass production around the time of the Civil War and the concerted governmental subsidy of scientific research during World War II.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, warfare had not changed markedly for the previous hundred years as evidenced by the Battle of Bull Run which was reminiscent of Revolutionary War battles. However, the manufacturing techniques of Eli Whitney were then turned to warfare; rapid manufacture and assembly of complex weapons and bullets allowed the massive introduction of machine guns, repeating rifles, revolvers, and ironclads. In a few short years, Grant's Peninsula Campaign and Sherman's March to the Sea were battles of a new type where massive technology was a meat grinder that slowly but surely ground the Confederacy into oblivion.

This technological meat grinder changed little through World War I, but technology again transformed warfare in World War II - mainly through the concerted effort of both the U.S. and German governments to win the war with new technology. Technology transformed warfare in a few years with the blitz, with carrier battles where the fleets never saw each other, and with the advent of the atomic bomb. During this military engineering revolution all the basic types of weapons that would be in place a half century later in Operation Desert Storm had already been employed by the military - radar, sonar, jet aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, fleet submarines, computers, and nuclear weapons. The only significant hardware in use today not employed in World War II are satellites, stealth bombers, and the mating of nuclear power and missiles with submarines.

The End of the Military Engineering Revolution - Physical Limits on Technology.

With the basic weapons packages in place at the end of World War II the ensuing Arms Race between East and West was first a struggle of engineering rather than science. Weapons became better; but, only in a few cases did they change dramatically - and even then the changes were caused by mating old technologies. In case after case the arms spiral continued with new generations of weapons that were significantly more complex and expensive yet their new capabilities were not commensurate with their cost. This is due to the normal course of engineering new technologies. As shown in Figure 1 a new technology when introduced will have marked advantages over the old technology. Prototypes have significant advantages over the old technology yet they are still far from optimum. Refinement of engineering rapidly increases the performance of the new technology. However, all technology is ultimately limited by some physical law. While later generations of the new technology increase performance, the relative increase slows as the technology approaches the physical limit. If we examine several of today's systems, we can see that our hardware technology is currently pushing many physical limits and may be difficult to improve in the future

Limits on range. The size of the tactical battlefield has continually increased throughout history. From World War II to the Persian Gulf the distance at which a tactical commander can detect and destroy a target has expanded from the distance that a single aircraft can fly to the entire globe. Satellites can carry cameras, radar, or IR sensors so target detection is no longer limited by range. Missiles can be detected virtually as they leave their launch silos. Aircraft and ships can be counted as they sit on the runway or tied up in their homeport. An ICBM can target a site anywhere in the world; today's ICBMs carry only nuclear weapons, but that is a doctrine decision not a technological one. A B-52 can take off in CONUS, drop its bombs in Kuwait, and land in Diego Garcia half a world away. The President can control predeployed forces worldwide and, as Carter showed, command a helicopter raid on Tehran from the White House.

The current limit on the tactical range of military forces is the ends of the earth. In short, it is unlikely that the range of tactical forces will increase in the forseeable future - there's just no point when the entire globe is your battlefield.

Limits on Speed. Time is the other major factor in increasing combat capability. For a tactical commander this translates to "how fast can I get people or ordnance on target?" Therefore, tactical capability depends on "speed limits" on the hardware.

In the past we could always think of increasing tactical capability by increasing the speed of the platform or weapon. Now we have to rethink our concepts of new hardware development because in virtually every case the latest platforms and weapons are pushing "speed limits" that will require reworking physical laws to exceed. Examining air, sea, and land platforms individually we can see that there are absolute speed limits imposed by the laws of physics or de facto speed limits imposed by cost/gain tradeoffs within the current scientific knowledge. Also we can see that for many of these limits there are "new revolutionary" systems that have been under development to bypass the speed limit, but these systems have remained "new" for many years because they are really are too costly or inefficient to gain widespread use.

Transport aircraft speed limit = the speed of sound. In atmospheric flight the major speed limit is Mach 1.0 - the speed of sound. To exceed this limit requires a significant increase in airframe strength and fuel consumption and, therefore, limits payload. Airframes depend on the chemical bond strength of the molecules in airframe materials; fuel efficiency depends both on the chemical bond strengths at high temperatures in engine components and on the energy density stored in the chemical bonds in the fuel molecules. Since wing loading depends both on the strength of wing components and on the physical limit of atmospheric lift, any extra weight that goes into airframe or fuel is weight that cannot be carried as payload. Therefore, transport aircraft effectiveness is a complex tradeoff dependent on the chemical bond strengths and energy densities of aircraft materials.

A detailed look at the increase in commercial transport aircraft cruising speed since 1920 indicates that there have been speed limits both on propeller-driven and jet airliners. As shown in Figure 2 the maximum cruising speed of propeller aircraft increased rapidly from under 100 mph in 1920 to almost 350 mph in 1953. Even with the introduction of the turboprop engine, the maximum cruising speed of propeller-driven aircraft has not increased in the last forty years. This is likely due to a de facto speed limit at an optimum tradeoff between maximum propeller thrust at low altitudes and minimum airframe drag at high altitudes. With the introduction of jet airliners in the late 1940s, a "breakthrough" curve for cruising speed was seen where the maximum increased from 490 mph in 1949 with the DeHavilland Comet to 640 mph in 1966 with the Boeing 747. However, there has been no major increase in airliner speed since the 747 (over the last tweny-six years) as airliner speed approaches Mach 1.

The single exception is the Concorde - an exception that proves the rule. The Concorde was a supersonic design introduced in 1976 which was advertised to "revolutionize" the world of air transport. However, after almost two decades of service, the Concorde remains at most a curiosity on how "breaking the speed limit" is too costly to have any noticeable effect on the commercial air market. The SST project was abandoned for the same reason, and the Space Plane has never really lived up to its promise.

Cruise missiles speed limit = the speed of sound. The speed limit for cruise missiles is the same as for transport aircraft for the same reasons, although the constraints are even more severe on cruise missiles because they have not been able to carry large conventional warheads in a small missile airframe. To date the energy cost has been too high to fly a large warhead at supersonic speeds. Several attempts at supersonic cruise missiles were tried in the late 1950's with the Mach 2 Regulus II and Hound Dog missiles, but like the Concorde they were replaced by smaller subsonic missiles2. From the V-1 through Harpoon to Tomahawk the most effective cruise missiles have been small airframes where the speed of sound has been approached, but it is unlikely to be exceeded in the next decade.

Fighter aircraft dogfight maneuvering limit = 2 g's and maximum maneuvering limit = 9 g's. In World War I fighter aircraft flew at 100 kt and turned at 35 deg/sec in dogfights; in World War II this increased to 250 kt but only at a turning rate of 24 deg/sec. Jet aircraft in the Korean War flew at 500 kt in dogfights but turned only at 15 deg/sec, and Vietnam spedd increased to 600 kt but turning rate remained at 14 deg/sec. Even though dogfighting has gone from biplanes to jets and current dogfights fill much larger volumes of sky than they did in World War I, the turning rates during dogfights have changed little in that time. Turning radius in a dogfight depends on a complex set of factors related to the angle of bank during the turn; as the banking angle increases lift decreases and the plane loses altitude more rapidly or even stalls and the ability of the pilot to aim or even orient himself while turning at large g forces decreases.3 Since all the turning rates above equate to about 2 g's in the turn, the limit on dogfighting may be in the human ability to react to a rapidly changing tactical picture and maintaining altitude under stress conditions.

The maximum emergency maneuvering speed of fighter aircraft has ultimately been limited by the physical limits of the human body. While the plane may be able to exceed 9 g's, no pilot has been designed who will not black out at those stresses.

Ballistic missile speed limit = 18,000 mph. Ballistic missiles depend on gravity and air resistance to bring them to their targets. If a missile is boosted to greater than 18,000 mph it will begin to orbit the earth. Therefore, whether the missile is a V-2, SCUD, Pershing, or Trident, it will have an identical flight path for a given range - limited by the law of gravity. Recent attempts to "revolutionize" space warfare have depended on bypassing this speed limit using low momentum "platforms" such as particle beams or lasers. These systems exploit the low momentum of individual particles or photons that can be redirected much more effectively from earth orbit - but the low momentum of these systems may ultimately limit their effectiveness.

Sea transport speed limit = 30 kt for spurts and 15 kt for sustained steaming. The USS Bainbridge (DD-1) in 1901 had a maximum speed of 29 kt yet almost a century later the top speed of the USS Spruance (DD-963) is 32 kt.4 While several classes of destroyers during the 1930s pushed 40 kt, overall there has been a de facto "speed limit" for shipping that was reached by 1900 when ships were still powered by reciprocating engines and coal. This limit is based on a combination of the energy density that can be packed into a naval power plant and transmitted to the water through a propeller coupled with the energy cost in the drag to move the water molecules out of the way as the hull passes. Since the power to speed relationship for moving a hull through the water can be almost quadratic (i.e. doubling speed quadruples the power required), the most efficient cruising speed for most ships on the ocean is 12 to 15 kt while top end speed is somewhere near 30 kt - except large combatants with nuclear propulsion. Therefore, since speed has not increased with the changeover from coal to oil and from turbine to gas turbine, it is unlikely that any task force will cruise faster in the next decade.

Again attempts to bypass this speed limit have been in progress for decades and have remained "revolutionary" curiosities rather than viable alternatives. The hydrofoil, surface effect ship, Spruce Goose, and Caspian Sea Monster have all depended on making a ship an aircraft - but aircraft require lifting themselves as well as their payloads into the air - all at high energy cost.

Land transport speed limit = "55 mph". The fastest secure method of transporting messages across the desert during Desert Storm was the motorcycle. As long as land vehicles roll and use conventional fuels it is unlikely that we will do better. The US 55 mph speed limit reflects that faster land transport is both energy inefficient and unsafe due to human reaction times. Another factor which comes into play in off-road transportation is the human body; a off-road vehicle can go only as fast as the suspension can reduce vibrations so that bones are not broken.

Attempts to bypass this land speed limit for troop transport have depended on making the land vehicle a low flying aircraft. Helicopters and surface effect ships can move people and equipment rapidly but are energetically inefficient because they are aircraft, not ground vehicles.

Communication speed limit = the speed of light. The ultimate speed limit in the universe is the speed of light. This limit has already come into play in the design of hardware for communications equipment and computers. All comunications equipment that uses electromagnetic radiation can pass information at the speed of light. This has already shown to be a problem in controlling deep space probes such as Voyager where there is a time lag of many seconds in the transmission. However, no attempts to speed the transmission have occurred because by our current knowledge no physical system can exceed the speed of light. Some new generation computers are so fast that they are already limited by the fact that electrons must move a finite distance across the microchip and it takes a measureable time to transit that chip - even near the speed of light. Parallel processing is the engineering paradigm to bypass the speed of light by computing along several "short" pathways simultaneously rather than along one "long" pathway.

Decision making speed limit = the speed of thought. The operational result of these technological advances is that the time to engage a target is now limited by the speed that the human brain can make a tactical decision. When detection, identification, and shooting are all controlled by computer, a combatent unit has a tactical link that can be totally automated at the speed of light. As both the USS Stark and USS Vincennes incidents have indicated, in the age of "information overload" the slowest link in the tactical chain is the human being making the decision whether to shoot or not. Therefore, any technological advances that increase the volume or rate of information collection will only further overload a commander's decision making ability.

The end of the engineering revolution. The engineering advances in the arms race have ultimately led to the same result - huge increases in hardware cost and complexity for marginal increases in performance. As shown by the squares in Figure 1 new generations of any platform follow the same pattern of diminishing returns. The first generation following a "breakthrough" is significantly more capable than the last generation of the old (e.g. the Nautilus nuclear submarine vs. a Foxtrot diesel sub). The next generation still is improving markedly and much better than the opposition's first generation model (e.g. Permit vs. November). Even though the opposition is always a generation behind, continued development lessens the absolute difference in performance so the relative lead decreases (e.g. Sturgeon vs. Victor to Los Angeles vs. Victor III then Akula) until finally the the next generation becomes so costly that its production becomes problematic (Seawolf).

One can look at the "cutting edge" of virtually every area of military weaponry and see that the hardware is pushing physical limits so closely that the next generation would require redesigning Newton's Laws, chemical bonds, or the human body. In fact, hardware has not improved markedly since Vietnam twenty years ago. Compare speed, range, and maneuverability of Vietnam era platforms with their Desert Storm equivalents: CVN Enterprise vs. CVN Nimitz, SSN Sturgeon vs. SSN Los Angeles, F-4 Phantom vs. F-14 Tomcat, P-3A Orion vs. P-3E Orion, B-52 bomber vs. the B-52 again along with the F-117 stealth bomber, and German Panther tank vs. M1A1 tank.

Even when one looks at the weapons carried on these platforms the hardware is still not significantly better than that of World War II. The Mk48 torpedo is not significantly faster than the Mk16 steam torpedo; the thirty year-old Sidewinder missile is still state of the art; the Tomahawk missile's only significant hardware advantage over the V-1 buzz bomb is its range; 500 lb bombs still make about the same size hole as they did during World War II. The description of a terror bombardment with short range missiles applies equally well to the German V-1/V-2 bombardment of London or the Iraqi Scud bombardment of Israel. By any comparison the speed, range, maneuverability, or ability to inflict or absorb (non-nuclear) damage of the platforms employed during Desert Storm were not very different than those that fought in Vietnam and, in most cases, not significantly greater than those that fought in Korea.

Therefore, it appears that the Engineering phase of the MTR is essentially over. Engineering technologies have pushed the physical limits of materials and human bodies to a point where new generations of weapons and platforms will be grossly more expensive for marginal gain. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, no country can afford the huge military budget to build and maintain a new generation of any weapon. Any country building up a miltary force must choose - one stealth aircraft or several Mirages? - one Seawolf or several Sturgeons? Given that sort of choice, it is unlikely that any opponent in the year 2002 will have any platforms or weapons superior to current U.S. capabilities. The major question now will be how many platforms comparable to current U.S. hardware can they afford?

2)The Military Sensor Revolution.

Vietnam to the USS Vincennes - Computerized Sensors and Smart Weapons

The weapons systems in Vietnam were superior to those in Korea, and the systems were better still during Desert Storm. The major advances in military weaponry since Korea (at least since the Nautilus) have been in information systems. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information has become the new revolution in military technology. This military information revolution has come through two stages - involving fighting individual platforms then coordinating many platforms.

The first information revolution in the U.S. and NATO military (and to some extent in the Soviet forces) came during the 60's and 70's with the computerization of individual platforms and weapons systems. Sensors became more sensitive due to computer image enhancement, data averaging techniques, and new data displays. Weapons became more potent due computerization of control systems; tactical missiles truly became guidable over the horizon. An individual platform could now detect, track, and destroy an individual ship or aircraft well beyond visual range with long range missiles such as the Harpoon, Talos, Phoenix, or Subroc or long range guidable torpedoes such as the Mk48. The overall result was that individual platforms became much more potent due to their increased information gathering ability when coupled with long range guidable weapons to go along with that capability.

However, this revolution also had a physical limit - the ability of an individual human brain to process the enormous quantities of information that were now available. A platform with new sensors that could "see" five times as far as before could cover twenty-five times as much ocean or airspace and detect twenty-five times as many contacts. Often these "contacts" were image-enhanced blips or lines on a radar or sonar display, and one of the major tactical decisions in any encounter was determining if a "contact" was friend, foe, or neutral. The battle in the age of "information overload" was now won by the platform that could sort through all the data most quickly and fire the first salvo. Major military disasters - at the Beirut marine barracks, the USS Stark, and the USS Vincennes - were due to inability to discriminate friend from foe quickly enough.

In response to this period of data overload, sensor evaluators became pre-eminent and tactical education at all levels of command become a top priority. A new billet of "Information Manager" was added to most organizational structures - either explicitly or by changing the major duties of a senior officer.

The real revolution of this MTR phase in the U.S. military was better combat efficiency due to an ability for individual platforms quickly and effectively to collect, collate, and react to huge quantities of sensor data and to launch rapidlyhighly sophisticated programmable weapons. This was due mainly to education throughout the chain of command and more disseminated responsibility in combat situations. Petty officers who used to collect sensor data had computers to collect it and were now the first level of evaluators - doing junior officer jobs. Junior officers were looking over their shoulders sorting through the glut of information to make tactical decisions on who was friend or foe and the major threat - doing senior officer jobs. Determining presets on the complex weapons was done by petty officers or JOs. Somewhere in the tactical chain either the NFO, TACO, or XO assumed a role as an "Information Manager" whose major duty was to sort through the rapidly changing tactical picture to advise the pilot or CO. Finally, pilots or COs had all they could do to respond quickly enough to the rapidly changing tactical picture depending almost completely on the critical evaluations of their operators, JOs, and "Information Managers".

The military sensor revolution is almost over in the U.S. military where continuous education is a way of life. Additionally, the highly motivated professional volunteer force has the intellectual ability to be able to "fleet up" a level so that every petty officer and officer in the tactical chain of command is doing the job that his next superior did only twenty years ago. This level of professionalism and training is also evident in the British and Israeli armed forces.

However, this revolution never did start in the Soviet forces nor any other non-democratic forces because the heart of this revolution is education - and education is very dangerous in a totalitarian military. For the sensor revolution to work, every member of the military force must be educated, not only in the capabilities of his own and opponent's platforms, sensors, and weapons, but also in analysis, responsibility, and decision making. A highly educated, analytical, thinking military is the most likely source of a coup in any totalitarian regime, so any totalitiarian chain of command is playing with fire to teach disseminated responsibility within its ranks. Therefore, the hallmark of the former Soviet military - a tightly controlled rigid chain of command - is also endemic in all Soviet-trained forces worldwide. This sensor revolution is, therefore, essentially complete - the U.S., British, Germans, and Israelis are already past it with a policy of education and increased responsibility, and totalitarian forces are reluctant even to allow it to start.

3) The Military Communication Revolution.

The 1970's through Desert Storm - The Total Integrated Force

The second phase of the information revolution began in the late 70's with the advent of new C3I to begin to handle the flood of data cooperatively - leading to the concept of total force integration. Sensor systems could collect a huge amount of data including over the horizon data; satellite systems could collect data worldwide. However, as long as sensor data was used on an individual platform basis, the problem of the USS Vincennes would remain - we could detect, track, and shoot very rapidly but often didn't know whom or what we were shooting at. The answer came in a total force integration - dependent on instant communications to pass sensor, intelligence, tracking, fire control, and command information among integrated forces.

In the Navy, the first signs of such a need came in the early 1970's when quieting of Soviet SSNs meant that no single unit could track them. The only answer was a total team effort, and new integrated tactics were developed to hunt a very quiet adversary. Satellite and SOSUS systems could give first warning of Soviet submarine sailings, and this intelligence could then be passed to the MPA community to attempt open ocean tracking. Early warning from these sources could then alert a coordinated CVBG screen of the possible Soviet SSN. The CVBG distant screen was an SSN(DS) in direct support since it provided the best anti-SSN detection capability. Again, a detection was usually at long range so that the SSN(DS) would then vector in carrier S-3 or helo assets or screen FFs which are superior tracking and attack platforms. The key to Soviet SSN interdiction was an air/sea/SSN/Intel coordinated effort dependent on C3I. Other than addition of SATCOM systems, today's C3I hardware is hardly superior to that in Vietnam - again the major revolution was in computerized methods and comms standardization to speed data handling coupled with massive training in all the communities. During the 80's updating C3I systems and constant total force training revolutionized all the U.S. armed services.

The effectiveness of the military communications revolution was the real key to the swift victory in Desert Storm. The interchangeability and cohesion of forces on a minute-by-minute basis on such a large scale was unheard of in any other operation in history. Previous invasions such as the Normandy invasion had as many forces involved but they were programmed beforehand and once launched the generals watched while individual units fought. In Desert Storm instantaneous communication coupled with precise navigation and remote sensors operated by professional coordinated forces ushered in a new era in wafare:

Perhaps the largest change brought about by the integration afforded by the communications revolution has been a much more flat command structure in the US military accompanied by a much more dispersed decision making structure. This has been caused by several factors:

The biggest challenge of the military communication revolution is to decide who is the best person to make each decision. In the past decisions were made at a given level because only that person had the information to do so, but now everyone in the chain of command has access to that information. Now the Commander in Chief can decide to drive helicopters in Iran from the White House or to sleep while Tripoli is bombed. The commander now has to know when to give an order and when to hang up the phone and let his organization do its job. In a sense, Schwartzkopf's brilliance in Desert Storm was knowing when to be quiet.

The military communications revolution hit its stride in Desert Storm. There were many problems in interoperability - such as the Navy's air strike communication system incompatibility with Army and Air Force so that computer discs needed to be flown daily from Saudi Arabia to the CVBGs in the Gulf. The MTR is, therefore, in this phase for U.S. and NATO forces where the lessons learned in Desert Storm need to be applied for better force compatibility, interoperability, and coordination. The increased portability of precision navigation devices, Satcom communications systems, and sensors again portends continued change in U.S. force capabilities which again must be coupled with concentrated continual training and improved decision making doctrine.

This phase of the MTR (like the previous one) may totally bypass totalitarian military forces. The Soviets tried to accomplish this coordination with intense communications updates and training, but force integration did not work effectively without individual platforms equipped and educated for the previous sensor revolution. Integrated forces need to know even more and must make more disseminated decisions than those that work with smart weapons independently. The extra dimension is that integrated forces must continually pass and receive sensor, targeting, and command data - all of which must be evaluated both on transmission and reception. Computers can help present the data, but as always evaluation and decision making - now multiplied by the number of communications - must be done by an operator or officer, and this is most effective when done at the lowest possible level. This multiplies the education needed in the chain of command and compounds the problem of entering the military communications revolution by a totalitarian force. Not only must all members of the force know how to think independently, but they must also know how to communicate and work with the rest of the force. A smart, educated, coordinated military team in a totalitarian regime is truly an oxymoron.

Conclusions

While we are still in the midst of a Military Technical Revolution, the character of that revolution is continually changing as the revolution has transitioned from one of high tech hardware to one of computerized sensors and smart weapons and now to one of communications.

Characteristics of the MTR over the next decade will likely follow patterns started in World War II:

CAPT Bodnar is a member of the U.S. Naval War College Reserve Volunteer Training Unit. While on active duty, he served on two attack submarines including two WestPac deployments and several special operations. In the Navy Reserves he spent ten years associated with the submarine force and five years as a technology analyst associated with the Office of Naval Research or the U.S. Naval War College. He is a Ph.D. biochemist and is currently a faculty member in the Chemistry Department at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Notes

  1. Compiled from: J.L. Naylor and E. Ower, Aviation: its technical development, Dufour Editions, Philadelphia, 1965; P.M. Bowers, Boeing Aircraft since 1916, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1989; R.J. Francillon, Lockheed Aircraft since 1913, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1987; R.J. Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1988; Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1988-1989.
  2. K.P.Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1985.
  3. M. Spick, Fighter Pilot Tactics - The Techniques of Daylight Air Combat, Stein and Day Publishers, NY, 1983.
  4. Destroyers in the United States Navy, Naval History Division, Washington, DC 1962.; Norman Friedman,U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD,1982.
  5. Alvin Toffler, Power Shift, Bantam Books, NY, 1990.

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